Low or High-Level Motor Coding? The Role of Stimulus Complexity by Amoruso, Lucia & Finisguerra, Alessandra
MINI REVIEW
published: 11 October 2019
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2019.00332
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 1 October 2019 | Volume 13 | Article 332
Edited by:
Laila Craighero,











†These authors have contributed
equally to this work
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Motor Neuroscience,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
Received: 15 April 2019
Accepted: 09 September 2019
Published: 11 October 2019
Citation:
Amoruso L and Finisguerra A (2019)
Low or High-Level Motor Coding? The
Role of Stimulus Complexity.
Front. Hum. Neurosci. 13:332.
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2019.00332
Low or High-Level Motor Coding?
The Role of Stimulus Complexity
Lucia Amoruso 1,2† and Alessandra Finisguerra 3*†
1 Basque Center on Cognition, Brain and Language, San Sebastian, Spain, 2 IKERBASQUE, Basque Foundation for Science,
Bilbao, Spain, 3 Scientific Institute, IRCCS E. Medea, Udine, Italy
Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) studies have shown that observing an action
induces activity in the onlooker’s motor system. In light of the muscle specificity and
time-locked mirroring nature of the effect, this motor resonance has been traditionally
viewed as an inner automatic replica of the observed movement. Notably, studies
highlighting this aspect have classically considered movement in isolation (i.e., using
non-realistic stimuli such as snapshots of hands detached from background). However,
a few recent studies accounting for the role of contextual cues, motivational states,
and social factors, have challenged this view by showing that motor resonance is not
completely impervious to top-down modulations. A debate is still present. We reasoned
that motor resonance reflects the inner replica of the observed movement only when its
modulation is assessed during the observation of movements in isolation. Conversely, the
presence of top-down modulations of motor resonance emerges when other high-level
factors (i.e., contextual cues, past experience, social, and motivational states) are taken
into account. Here, we attempt to lay out current TMS studies assessing this issue and
discuss the results in terms of their potential to favor the inner replica or the top-down
modulation hypothesis. In doing so, we seek to shed light on this actual debate and
suggest specific avenues for future research, highlighting the need for a more ecological
approach when studying motor resonance phenomenon.
Keywords: action observation, motor resonance, kinematics mapping, top down modulations, motor evoked
potentials, corticospinal excitability, transcranial magnetic stimulation
INTRODUCTION
Understanding others’ intentions via observing their actions is critical for social cognition. This
ability is considered to be supported by the so-called mirror neuron system (MNS, Rizzolatti et al.,
1996), a collection of fronto-parietal regions which become active during both observation and
execution of similar actions. While initially discovered in monkeys (di Pellegrino et al., 1992),
MNS-like activity has also been shown in humans by means of higher activation in the primary
motor cortex (M1) in response to observed human actions, as compared to action unrelated control
conditions (Fadiga et al., 2005). Here, we refer to motor resonance as an index of mirror-like
activity, which reflects an enhancement of M1 corticospinal excitability (CSE) during action
observation (AO). A classical way to measure motor resonance relies on the use of motor-evoked
potentials (MEPs) induced with transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) in peripheral muscles,
which reflect the level of CSE resulting fromM1 stimulation. Despite the agreement in considering
motor resonance as a marker of MNS-like activity, its specificity and meaning is still unclear
(D’Ausilio et al., 2015). Indeed, there is an ongoing debate as to whether motor resonance would
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reflect an automatic replica of the observed movement, thus
mirroring the kinematic features of the observed action, or
rather its final goal and overarching intention, thus reflecting a
more flexible process. Briefly, when considering action coding,
different hierarchical levels can be identified (see Figure 1A):
(i) the muscle level, which codes for the pattern of muscular
activity required to execute the action; (ii) the kinematics level,
which maps the movements of the effectors in space and time;
(iii) the goal level, which includes the short-term transitive or
intransitive aim; and (iv) the intention level, which includes the
long-term purpose behind the action (Hamilton and Grafton,
2007). Interestingly, it has been proposed that, in addition to
these well-known four levels, context can be seen as a fifth top-
down level guiding action comprehension under situations of
perceptual uncertainty (Kilner et al., 2007, Kilner, 2011). In this
view, contextual cues and prior knowledge would aid action
recognition by signaling which intentions are more likely to
drive upcoming actions given the information present in the
environment, forming the basis to estimate lower-level aspects of
action representation (i.e., kinematics).
Here, we propose that motor resonance mirrors low-level
aspects when stimulus complexity is low or when no additional
manipulations on the observer’s expectations or motivational
states are present in the task at hand. Alternatively, but
not exclusively, high-level factors can intervene and modulate
motor resonance when more complex stimuli and/or task
manipulations are taken into account. By stimulus complexity,
we refer to the amount of information available to the observer
in different AO paradigms (see Figure 1B). Basically, stimulus
complexity can span from a low complexity degree conceivable
when hand/arm movement kinematics is presented in isolation
to a higher complexity degree when movement kinematics can
be dissociated from its goal or underlying intention. Lastly, the
highest complexity degree can be conceived when stimuli are
presented in wider social scenarios including objects, agents, and
their possible interactions. Thus, in the present paper the term
“complexity” is strictly related to the ecological dimension of
the stimulus.
Claiming that low-level or rather high-level aspects are
reflected in the observers’ motor system would imply the
possibility of finding differential patterns of responses in CSE.
Generally, motor resonance can be featured by, at least, three
core elements: muscle-specificity, direction, and timing of the
modulation (see Naish et al., 2014 for a review). First, muscle-
specificity during AO implies a change in the activation of
the cortical representation of the muscles that are specifically
involved either in the observed action or in its execution (Fadiga
et al., 1995; Strafella and Paus, 2000). In keeping with the
lateralization patterns for motor control, the observed body part
is mapped onto the contralateral M1 region controlling it (Aziz-
Zadeh et al., 2002). Second, the direction of the modulation
Abbreviations: AE, Action Execution; AO, Action Observation; CSE, Cortico
Spinal Excitability; FDI, First Dorsal Interosseous; M1, Primary motor cortex;
MEP, Motor Evoked Potentials; MNS, Mirror Neuron System; TMS, Transcranial
Magnetic Stimulation.
could consist in an increase or a decrease in CSE during AO,
which could mirror, or not, the modulation of muscle activation
during action execution. Importantly, even if in most of the
cases AO mirroring is reflected into an increase in CSE with
respect to a baseline level, CSE decreases during AO have also
been reported (Gangitano et al., 2004; Janssen et al., 2015;
Amoruso and Urgesi, 2016). Whatever the direction of this CSE
modulation is, these effects might result from the simultaneous
contribution of excitatory and inhibitory mechanisms, involving
premotor and primary cortices (Vigneswaran et al., 2013,
Kraskov et al., 2014; Gueugneau et al., 2016). Differences in
TMS protocols and experimental designs may unveil excitatory
or inhibitory mechanisms, possibly reflecting covert imitation
or the withholding of unintended overt movement during AO.
Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that the direction of CSE
modulation reported in each study may have a different meaning,
mainly depending on the selection of the baseline condition with
which the effects are compared and the way data are normalized
(Naish et al., 2014).
Lastly, the timing of the modulation depends upon the
delay at which motor resonance occurs, with respect to action
observation onset. In this vein, a CSE modulation occurring
immediately after the perception of an action is taken as a
marker of the automatic simulation and the faithful covert
replica of the observed movement. Time-locked modulations
can be assessed by recording MEPs at different time points
during AO (Sartori et al., 2013; Cavallo et al., 2014; Mc
Cabe et al., 2015; Amoruso et al., 2016). Based on the
presence of somatotopic, direction-specific, or time-locked
effects, motor resonance has been conceived as an inner
replica of the observed movements (Naish et al., 2014), thus
reflecting the automatic mapping of low-level motor aspects.
Conversely, when movements are observed embedded in a
richer context (i.e., where the information at hand allows
representing the action at a higher-level such as the goal
one), the observed kinematic seems to be mirrored in a
less specific fashion. Thus, motor resonance becomes prone
to top-down modulations and switches from low to high
representational levels. With this mini review, we sought to
understand whether stimulus complexity, in combination with
the timing at which indices of motor resonance are recorded,
could explain why, in some cases, motor resonance corresponds
to the automatic muscle-specific, direction-dependent, and time-
locked simulation of the observed movement, while in other
cases high-level factors and top-down modulations make motor
resonance a more flexible phenomenon. Given this aim, here
we focus on neurophysiological studies using single-pulse TMS
and measuring MEPs in combination with action observation
paradigms. Starting from the seminal studies finding a close
correspondence between CSE modulation and low-level features
during AO, we moved to examine those studies addressing how
this low-level mirroring could be affected by, or dissociated from,
high-level features (e.g., the goal of an action), and finally to more
recent studies exploring the occurrence of top-down modulation
during AO. Details of the revised literature are reported in
Supplementary Table 1.
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FIGURE 1 | Hierarchical model of action representation and examples of stimuli varying in their level of complexity. The left panel (A) shows the different levels of
description at which actions can be understood. Initially, this motor hierarchy included the muscle, the kinematics, the goal and the intention levels (Hamilton and
Grafton, 2007). More recently, context has been proposed as a higher top-down level assisting intention coding under situations of perceptual ambiguity (Kilner et al.,
2007). The right panel (B) shows different versions of the same stimulus varying in the amount of information provided to the observer, from kinematics only to the
presence of contextual cues. In the depicted example, without the broader context including the sugar pot either opened or closed, it would be difficult to
disambiguate if the precision grip used by the model is directed toward the spoon, hence cueing to the intention of pouring sugar in the coffee or, alternatively, to the
handle of the cup, thus cueing to the intention of drinking coffee.
FROM KINEMATICS TO GOALS:
MIRRORING ACTIONS AT DIFFERENT
LEVELS OF REPRESENTATION
After Fadiga et al. (1995)’s seminal study showing motor
resonance during AO in humans, Gangitano et al. (2001)
reported a muscle-specific increase in CSE for finger opening
movements which reflected the increased amount of aperture
coherent with the observed movement phase. Phase-and muscle-
specific modulations were further shown during the observation
of either transitive (Montagna et al., 2005) or intransitive
movements (Borroni et al., 2005) and during the observation
of possible and impossible finger movements (Romani et al.,
2005). Moreover, enhanced muscle-specific motor resonance
for abduction finger movements is influenced by onlooker’s
hand orientation (Maeda et al., 2002) and position, congruently
with the maximal activation of the same muscles during action
execution (AE) under different postures (Urgesi et al., 2006).
Importantly, while claiming for a muscle specific modulation,
only few of these studies assessed the correspondence between
the observed modulation and the actual involvement of the same
muscle during action execution (Fadiga et al., 1995; Borroni et al.,
2005; Montagna et al., 2005; Romani et al., 2005; Urgesi et al.,
2006).
Nevertheless, the finding of CSE modulations for intransitive
actions challenged the initial view, grounded on monkey studies,
that the MNS primarily encodes the action goal rather than
the observed movements (Gallese et al., 1996; Umiltà et al.,
2001). While favoring the low-level hypothesis, according to
which motor resonance is a covert mimicry of the observed
movement, these findings opened the debate about which
action level is motor resonance coding for. However, these
previous studies did not allow dissociating the contribution of
kinematics vs. goal encoding, leaving the controversy about the
level of action representation unsolved. To clarify this issue,
Cattaneo et al. (2009) designed a paradigm to dissociate the
two aspects. Participants observed a hand manipulating normal
or reverse pliers without an evident goal or, alternatively, with
the goal to grasp an object. Observing closing vs. opening
hand movements when no goal was present (i.e., closing the
normal or opening the reverse pliers without grasping an
object) resulted in stronger activation of the opponens pollicis
(i.e., a muscle involved in thumb opposition for finger closing
movement), thus mirroring the hand movements. Conversely,
when a goal was present, motor resonance no longer reflected the
observed hand movements but rather the motor goal (achieved
by opposite movements of the hand manipulating the pliers).
While suggesting an incorporation of the tool into the body
representation and the possibility for motor resonance to be
shaped accordingly, these results supported the influence of high-
level features on motor resonance.
Although divergent findings have also been found (Cavallo
et al., 2012), the integrated contribution of kinematics and goal
coding has been widely supported. For instance, Mc Cabe et al.
(2015) found that observing the grasping of small or big objects
induced both a kinematic- and a goal-specific modulation of
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CSE, but only when the goal could be inferred from the initial
part of the movement. Conversely, when the motor goal was
ambiguous (i.e., switched online between objects) and the goal
could no longer be inferred, CSE modulation mirrored low-level
kinematics only. In this study, the amount of visual information
provided and the time at which motor facilitation was recorded
were crucial in biasing the modulation toward either the low- or
the high-level CSE modulation view. Thus, when the complexity
of the visual stimulus increases (i.e., the information provided
allows representing the action at a higher-level such as the
goal one), motor resonance switches from the low to the high
representational level. In the absence of this information, motor
facilitation mimics the observed kinematics.
In line with this view, Betti et al. (2015) found that
the observation of index finger movements, in isolation,
triggered muscle-specific CSE modulations. However, when
similar kinematics were then used in a symbolic way to simulate
an action typically performed with the leg (i.e., a soccer penalty
kick), CSE modulations were observed in both hand and leg
muscles, suggesting a simultaneous representation of action
meaning and movement kinematics in the observer’s motor
system. Differently stated, as complexity in the observed stimulus
increased, motor resonance switched from low- to high-level
mapping, showing a generalization between muscles. Likewise,
Finisguerra et al. (2015) found that, during the observation
of intransitive closing hand movements, an increase in motor
resonance for a forearm flexor muscle (involved in hand closing)
generalized across other effectors involved in performing closing
movements (i.e., eyelid, mouth). Even if no modulation in
stimulus complexity was present, it is likely that the common
action goal, which could be inferred from the observed set
of stimuli, contributed to this high-level mapping of action
meaning. Additional evidence comes from Senna et al’s study
(2014), in which familiarity with an observed action elicited a
shift from lower- to higher-level motor mapping. Specifically,
participants viewed typical hand actions (i.e., grasping a pencil)
and typical foot actions (i.e., pressing a pedal) that could be
performed by either a hand or a foot effector, resulting in familiar
or unfamiliar actions if performed with the typical or an atypical
effector, respectively. Observing unfamiliar actions resulted in an
effector specific modulation of hand and foot CSE. Conversely,
during the observation of familiar actions, CSEmodulation of the
muscle involved in the represented action generalized across both
effectors. This evidence hence suggests that actions can be coded
either in a somatotopic low-level or in a goal high-level fashion,
depending on the familiarity with the observed action.
FROM MUSCLE AND FORCE
REQUIREMENTS TO INTENTION
REPRESENTATION
Beyond these well-detectable kinematic features mirroring the
phase, the type, the extent and the effector of an observed action,
other studies sought to understand whether motor resonance
could be sensitive to less salient changes in kinematic signals,
such as muscle involvement and force requirements during
AE. In this vein, Alaerts et al. (2009) aimed to disentangle
the contribution of muscle and movement direction coding to
motor resonance. Participants were asked to observe a model
performing upward movements of the wrist. These movements
could require the involvement of the flexor or the extensor
muscle, depending on the starting position of the model’s hand
(palm-up or palm-down). Importantly, participants could keep
their hand in a palm up or palm down position so that their
posture could be congruent or incongruent with respect to the
posture of the model. Muscle-specific mapping would imply
that the increased activation of the model’s muscle during
the observation of upward wrist movement led to a muscle-
specific CSE modulation in the observer, independently from
the observer’s posture. Conversely, direction-specific mapping
would imply an activity modulation specific for the muscle that
allows for the execution of an upward movement depending on
the posture of the observer, thus independently from the muscle
activated in the model’s movement. Given that they only found
an interaction between the observer’s muscle and the model’s
movement, CSE facilitation was thought to be independent from
the muscle involved in the observed movement. Importantly,
even if no significant effects or interactions with observer’s
posture were found, the muscle-specific facilitation was maximal
during congruent postures (i.e., when the muscular and the
directional parameters overlapped), and became less evident,
albeit still present for one muscle, when the muscular and
directional features were discordant.
Interestingly, in a subsequent study, Alaerts et al. (2010a)
found that motor resonance was congruent with the degree
of muscular involvement in AE. Indeed, while keeping the
observed action (i.e., grasping-and-lifting-the-object) constant
but changing the object weight, greater facilitation for heavy
object lifting than light object lifting was found. Moreover, the
observation of either precision or power grasp-to-lift resulted
in a weight-dependent muscle-specific motor resonance. Despite
this modulation potentially resembling the gradually increasing
activation of these muscles in AE, these findings only partially
support the low-level coding hypothesis. Indeed, in these studies,
information about object weight could be easily inferred from
object appearance. Thus, as the authors themselves suggested,
their stimuli did not allow clarifying whether the force-related
effects on motor resonance were driven by low-level kinematics
observation or by high-level expectations triggered by object
properties. In a follow-up study (Alaerts et al., 2010b), the role
of different visual cues (i.e., kinematic profile, hand contraction,
and intrinsic object properties) contributing to motor resonance
during object lifting were separately tested. Even if the
weight information carried by movement kinematics and hand
contraction modulated motor resonance in the opponens pollicis
and extensor carpi radialis muscles, a conflict betweenmovement
kinematics and object appearance reduced the weight-dependent
modulation in the opponens pollicis. While supporting a low-
level coding of observed action, we interpret these findings
as evidence for a contribution of observers’ expectations (e.g.,
triggered by object properties) in interfering with the weight-
dependent motor resonance modulation. Indeed, findings from
a following study support this view. For instance, in Senot
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et al. (2011), the observation of lift-to-place actions directed to
heavy or light objects led to a weight-dependent activation of
the FDI muscle, regardless of object intrinsic properties (i.e.,
when the content of a bottle was visible or hidden from view),
suggesting that movement kinematics was enough to modulate
CSE. However, when explicit semantic cues, either congruent
or incongruent with respect to the actual object weight, were
provided by verbal labels, the weight-dependent modulation
ceased. Unfortunately, the possibility that the limited sample size
of participants (Alaerts et al., 2009; Senot et al., 2011) may have
led to underpowered studies unable to unmask the interactive
effects, cannot be excluded and caution is needed when drawing
conclusions from this data.
The relevance of low- and high-order factors in shaping
motor resonance was further confirmed by a set of subsequent
studies dealing with object weight discrimination (Tidoni et al.,
2013; Finisguerra et al., 2018). In Tidoni et al. (2013), motor
resonance modulations were assessed during the observation of
reach-to-lift actions of either light or heavy objects that could be
performed with a genuine or a deceptive intention. Even if motor
resonance was greater for heavy than light object grasping, the
authors also found that observing deceptive actions facilitated
FDI CSE more than observing genuine actions, regardless of
object weight. However, this study did not allow for ascertaining
whether low-level (i.e., the altered kinematic patterns required to
deceive the observer) or high-level (i.e., the deceptive intention)
features explained the observed effect. Thus, in a subsequent
study, Finisguerra et al. (2018) sought to solve this question.
By independently manipulating the actor’s deceptive or genuine
intentions and kinematic alterations, the authors found that while
the observation of deceptive actions facilitated CSE in a muscle-
independent fashion, the observation of kinematic alterations
driven by genuine intentions induced a muscle-specific CSE
inhibition, which resembled the pattern of muscle activation
during AE in the same condition. Overall, both low-level and
high-level features were mirrored into the observer’s motor
system in a dissociable fashion.
TOP-DOWN CONTEXTUAL MODULATIONS
DURING ACTION OBSERVATION
Mounting evidence suggests that motor resonance can be
modulated by a wide range of high-level contextual factors.
Indeed, human actions do not occur in isolation but rather
embedded in internal and external contexts.
On the one hand, when considering studies reporting
top-down modulations associated to internal factors, such as
individual personality traits and temperament, it appears that
they play a critical role during AO. For instance individuals
with an increased level of harm avoidance personality trait,
which is mainly characterized by excessive worrying, exhibited
reduced motor resonance during the observation of immoral as
compared to neutral actions (i.e., stealing a wallet vs. picking up
a notepaper, respectively) containing similar kinematics (Liuzza
et al., 2015). Likewise, Craighero and Mele (2018) reported that
the observation of an agent performing an action with negative
(i.e., unpleasant) consequences on a third person results in
decreased motor resonance as compared to the observation of
actions underpinning positive and neutral intentions with equal
kinematics. Nevertheless, no correlations were observed in this
latter case between the levels of harm avoidance personality trait
and the CSE effect.
The observer’s current state also plays a critical role during
AO. For instance, Hogeveen and Obhi (2012) found that,
during the observation of human and robotic actions (i.e.,
a human hand or grabber reaching tool squeezing a ball,
respectively), participants previously involved in a naturalistic
social interaction with the experimenter, showed increased CSE
for the observation of human actions as compared to robotic
ones. This effect was absent in those individuals not previously
engaged in the social interaction, with human and robotic actions
triggering similar levels of CSE. In amore recent study, Hogeveen
et al. (2014) found that CSE while observing a hand squeezing
a ball becomes differentially modulated after participants being
exposed to a low- or a high-power induction priming procedure
(i.e., recalling a memory in which someone else had power over
observers or in which the observer had power over someone
else). Participants in the high-power group showed less motor
resonance facilitation relative to the low-power group, suggesting
that people in positions of power display reduced interpersonal
sensitivity and diminished processing of social input. In sum,
these studies suggest that prior naturalistic social interactions
of different kinds modulate motor resonance for subsequent
action observation.
Another factor that has been reported to modulate AO is
prior experience and/or familiarity with the observed action
(Aglioti et al., 2008; Candidi et al., 2014). Candidi et al. (2014)
showed to expert pianists and naïve controls videos displaying
a professional pianist that could perform fingering errors while
playing musical scales. Even though non-pianist controls were
visually trained to recognize the errors in the videos, only
piano experts showed a somatotopic modulation in the abductor
pollicis brevis muscle (i.e., the muscle involved in the execution
of the piano fingering errors), with increased MEP amplitudes
300ms after error onset. Overall, this suggests that prior motor
(but non-visual) experience is necessary for motor resonance.
A similar increase in MEP amplitudes in the abductor digiti
minimi muscle have been reported in basketball experts while
observing “out” as compared to “in” shots in a basket (Aglioti
et al., 2008). While demonstrating that prior motor experience
provides a fine-grained simulative error monitoring system to
evaluate others’ movements, these studies suggest that high-level
information (i.e., movement correctness) can influence motor
resonance during AO.
On the other hand, parallel top-down modulations have been
observed when considering external contextual factors. In a series
of studies, Amoruso et al. (Amoruso and Urgesi, 2016; Amoruso
et al., 2016) explored the role of contextual information in
modulating action coding at lower levels of representation (i.e.,
muscle and kinematics). CSE was measured while participants
were asked to observe actors performing everyday actions
embedded in congruent, incongruent or ambiguous contexts,
and to recognize actor’s intention. Context-action congruency
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was manipulated in terms of compatibility between grasping
kinematics and action setting. For instance, within a breakfast
scenario (e.g., a cup full of coffee), the actor could grasp the
cup by its handle with a precision grip (congruent condition) or
with a whole-hand grip from the top (incongruent condition).
Ambiguous contexts (i.e., a cup half full of coffee) where different
types of actions were equally plausible were also used. As
compared to the neutral condition, the congruence between
the movements and the context increased CSE at early stages
(∼240ms after action onset), while incongruence between them
resulted into a later inhibition (∼400ms) for the FDI muscle,
which is involved in reaching-to-grasping movements. Crucially,
the different time course and direction (i.e., facilitation vs.
inhibition) of the observed effects suggests that they stem from
partially independent mechanisms, with the early facilitation
directly involving simulative motor resonance through the
classical AO network, and the later inhibition recruiting
structures outside of this network conveying information about
the intention estimated from the context.
Additional evidence from a role of top-down contextual
modulation on motor resonance comes from two recent studies.
In the first one, Riach et al. (2018) used a similar logic but
introduced a baseline condition in which actions were observed
without a context. Similar to Amoruso et al. (2016) findings,
observation of actions within congruent contexts (i.e., pinching
a sponge in a kitchen background) facilitated FDI CSE as
compared to baseline. No modulation of CSE resulted from
AO in incongruent contexts. In a second study by Cretu et al.
(2019), participants observed either full or occluded videos of
an actor grasping and lifting a jar using a precision or a whole-
hand grip. Color cues preceded observation trials and were
manipulated in terms of their informativeness in predicting
the upcoming action. Overall, the authors found that even in
the absence of movement kinematics (i.e., occluded condition),
contextual reliable cues were sufficient to trigger a muscle-
specific response in the observer. Nevertheless, when presenting
both sources of information together (i.e., kinematics and
context), CSE facilitation became stronger than when either
source was presented alone. These findings support the view that
motor resonance triggered by observed kinematics and top-down
contextual information interact in the observer’s motor system.
Regarding the inhibitory effects on CSE reported for
contextual conflicting information (Amoruso and Urgesi, 2016;
Amoruso et al., 2016), similar findings were reported by Janssen
et al. (2015). They showed that incongruence between an action
specified by a prior symbolic cue (i.e., an arrow indicating the
requirement of a whole-hand grip) and the observed action (i.e.,
movement implying a precision grip) leads to a reduction in
motor resonance for the observed action, with CSE replicating
the motor pattern of the action specified by the prior cue.
Likewise, Mattiassi et al. (2014) found that the observation of
hand movements preceded by an incongruent masked prime
(e.g., a different hand movement) decreases motor resonance
responses in a comparable fashion.
Finally, another aspect that has been shown to modulate
motor resonance is the social nature of the context. Sartori
et al. (2013) recorded MEPs at different time points while
participants observed action sequences that could call for a
complementary response (or not) depending on the context.
Specifically, participants were asked to observe videos of a model
grasping a spoon or a thermos to pour sugar or coffee into three
cups/mugs located on a table next to her, using a precision or
a whole-hand grip, respectively. After this, the model poured
sugar/coffee into a fourth cup/mug that was located far away
from her and, thus, closer to the participant observing the video.
Crucially, a person wanting to pick-up that fourth cup/mug
would need to use either a precision or a whole-hand grip to do
it. Interestingly, the authors found that, while at the beginning
of the video, when the context called for an imitative action,
participant’s CSE reflected symmetrical motor resonance for
actions performedwith the thermos in the abductor digiti minimi
(a muscle mostly involved in whole-hand grasping), during the
last part, it shifted to simulate the complementary response,
with decreased abductor digiti minimi CSE for actions evoking a
complementary response using a precision grip (i.e., grasping the
cup). The reverse pattern was found for the spoon-related action.
These findings point to the fact that motor resonance can be
modulated (i.e., shift from emulation to reciprocity) depending
on the social context in which it takes place, in agreement with
a flexible view of this phenomenon (Heyes, 2010, Keysers and
Gazzola, 2014).
Overall, a final consideration integrating both internal and
external factors should be made. It has been shown that when
contextual cues are not available, information from observed
movement kinematics forms the basis for action comprehension
(Soriano et al., 2018). However, it is also true that not all
individuals are able to detect subtle kinematic differences from
observed movements (Naish et al., 2013) and this ability may
vary from one individual to another. Thus, assessing individual
personality traits such as observer’s visual processing style during
the experiments may be a useful approach to better understand




All in all, despite task and stimulus-related differences across
the reviewed studies, a clear picture emerges, suggesting that
motor resonance is not an automatic response reflecting the
inner replica of the observed movement but rather a dynamic
and flexible phenomenon, prone to modulations of internal and
external factors.
First, as soon as the experimental design allows for a
dissociation between the kinematics and the goal profiles or when
the complexity of the stimuli increases, a transition from low-
to high-level mapping becomes evident (Cattaneo et al., 2009;
Mc Cabe et al., 2015). Similarly, when considering studies on
object weight discrimination, motor resonance mirrors force-
related modulations only when no additional information or
experimental manipulations about object intrinsic and extrinsic
properties are present. When a conflict between the observed
action and the object-based expectations takes place, or when
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these expectations are diverted through deceptive intentions,
high-level rather than low-level features shape motor resonance
(Tidoni et al., 2013; Finisguerra et al., 2018).
Second, studies reporting motor resonance modulations
triggered by contextual cues during action recognition suggest
the involvement of at least two distinct mechanisms of motor
resonance regulation. Specifically, when perceptual movement
kinematics and external contextual information are compatible
and point to the same underlying motor intention, a muscle-
specific facilitation of CSE becomes evident (Amoruso et al.,
2016; Riach et al., 2018; Cretu et al., 2019). Conversely, when
external contextual-cues are not compatible with the observed
kinematics, motor resonance becomes suppressed/reduced
(Janssen et al., 2015; Amoruso and Urgesi, 2016). Interestingly,
an analog suppression is observed when the action due to
its immoral or negative valence conflicts with the observer’s
personality (Liuzza et al., 2015; Craighero and Mele, 2018).
Third, regarding the notion of stimulus complexity previously
described in the introduction, it emerges that studies reporting
low-level motor coding have mostly considered movement
in isolation (i.e., using snapshots of hands detached from
background). However, when movements are observed in more
ecological settings, motor resonance integrates high-level aspects
of action representation on its mirroring pattern.
When considering timing, only few of the reviewed studies
explored the modulation of CSE during AO at different time-
points depending on the phase of the movement (Cavallo et al.,
2012; Sartori et al., 2013; Candidi et al., 2014; Mattiassi et al.,
2014; Betti et al., 2015; Janssen et al., 2015; Mc Cabe et al., 2015;
Amoruso et al., 2016; Cretu et al., 2019). Overall, those studies
tracking the time-course of top-down modulations indicate that
they arise from around ∼240–300ms post movement onset
but not before. This is in line with a recent two-stage model
(Naish et al., 2014; Naish and Obhi, 2015) suggesting that
muscle-specific and high-level modulations on M1 responses
occur in a later time-window, from ∼200ms after movement
onset onwards.
Nevertheless, other potential explanations can account for
the alternative mapping of low- and high-level features during
AO. For instance, starting from motor control model of action,
D’Ausilio et al. (2015) have proposed that this fragmentation,
in the representation of low- and high-level aspects during AO,
mirrors the synergistic organization of the motor system. As
such, the functional output of the motor system can be better
extrapolated from TMS-induced Motor Evoked Kinematics
MEKs than by single-muscle MEPs (Bartoli et al., 2014;
Finisguerra et al., 2015; Fricke et al., 2017; Hilt et al., 2017).
Differently from MEPs, MEKs are thought to measure the effect
of the synergistic activity of multiple muscles underlying the
execution of coordinated movements, under the influence of
intracortical, corticospinal, spinal, and peripheral factors (Fetz
et al., 2002; Hilt et al., 2017). Thus, methodological aspects
could also explain differences in the revised literature and future
research addressing this issue is clearly required.
In view of this, some considerations should be made about
potential methodological limitations identified in the reviewed
studies and what could be improved. A first aspect that emerges
is that only few of these studies recorded EMG also during AE
and not solely during AO. Indeed, the absence of AE evidence
narrows the possibility of claiming for a muscle-specific effect.
Second, a proper control condition is not always used in these
studies, which makes it difficult to ensure that observed effects
truly correspond to the experimental manipulation or to other
confounding factors. Despite a few cases lacking a baseline
measure (Montagna et al., 2005; Cattaneo et al., 2009; Alaerts
et al., 2010b; Senot et al., 2011), most of the revised studies report
AO effects on CSE with respect to a baseline level. However,
baseline levels were acquired under diverse conditions, withMEP
recorded during eye-closed conditions or during observation
of a black screen, a fixation cross, geometrical shapes, moving
stimuli, static object, and static hand. Nevertheless, from all these
heterogeneous measures, only the static hand condition takes
into account the activation that the observation of a biological
effector can induce per se on CSE. At the same time, when the
observation of a static hand is used as a baseline measure, the
possible effects induced by the implied motion present in the
stimuli (Urgesi et al., 2010) can lead to a suppression rather than
to an enhancement in CSE during the AO conditions vs. the
baseline level (Mc Cabe et al., 2015). Importantly, the selection
has to be driven by the experimental stimuli used in the main
protocol and the experimental question. Following the rationale
underscored by this mini review, a relaxed hand detached from
the context would be the appropriate control condition to assess
the transition from the lowest to the highest level in action
representation depending on stimulus complexity.
Finally, we consider that the use of designs allowing
dissociating motor coding at different levels of representation as
well as controlled experimental conditions varying the amount
of stimulus complexity would also be of great help to shed
light on this issue. More specifically, this proposal opens future
avenues to empirically test a set of hypotheses on how motor
resonance responses may vary (or not) at different levels of
action representation (i.e., muscle, kinematics, goals/intentions)
when manipulating external and internal factors. For instance,
an ideal experimental approach would comprise a battery of
tasks varying the degree of the information provided to the
observers (e.g., from frames showing handmovement kinematics
in isolation to frames showing them in relation to objects and,
finally, embedded in a wider social scenario). This would help
to disentangle how external factors modulate motor resonance
within the same set of participants and tasks in a controlled
fashion. Furthermore, by measuring participants’ individual
traits, correlations between their personality profiles and their
motor and behavioral responses can be performed in order to
explore the possible influence of internal factors. For instance,
Amoruso et al. (2018) have recently found that individuals with
a high amount of autistic traits (i.e., social deficits and greater
detail-processing style) are more impaired in suppressing motor
resonance when a mismatch between kinematics and context
occurs, pointing to difficulties in their integration. Shedding light
on this latter aspect would allow for a better understanding of its
functional role, not only in neurotypical individuals but also in
psychiatric disorders such as autism, in which abilities grounded
in motor resonance are critically impaired.
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